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ACCESS GRANTED: THE WINKELMAN CASE USHERS
IN A NEW ERA IN PARENTAL ADVOCACY

Laura McNeal*

I. INTRODUCTION
According to the U.S. Department of Education, nearly 6.8
million children currently receive special education services in
secondary schools. 1 Historically, our nation's response to
students with disabilities was segregation from the general
classroom, exclusion, and institutionalization. 2 However,
groundbreaking legislation, such as the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, opened our nation's schools to
students with special needs, and also served as the catalyst for
a major culture shift toward a higher quality education for
students with disabilities. This trend toward increasing the
quality of special education continued with the enactment of
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 3 ,
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act4 , the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) 5 , and the No Child Left Behind Act 6 .
Collectively, these laws form the legal landscape for special
education in America's schools.

*Assistant Professor of Urban Education, Department of Teacher Education, Michigan
State University.
1. United
States
Department
of
Education,
http://www.ed.gov/about/officesllist/osers/osep/index.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
2. LARRY D. BARTLETT, SUSAN ETSCHEIDT & GREG R. WEISENSTEIN, SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5-8 (2d ed. 2007).
3. Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S. C. § 1400 (2006).
4. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S. C. § 794(a) (2006).
5. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S. C.§§ 12,101-12,213 (1988 & Supp. II 1988). Many of the Act's
key provisions are drawn from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i
(1988 & Supp. II 1988), which provided limited employment protection for
"handicapped" employees of the federal government, federal contractors, and recipients
of federal aid.
6. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-7941.
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In recent years, there has been an increased interest in
promoting educational equity within America's schools.
Researchers, educators, and policymakers have struggled to
find solutions to the nation's achievement gap and provide all
students with a high quality education. As a result, there has
been an increased focus on improving the quality of education
for students with disabilities. This is evidenced by the
enhanced accountability measures embedded within federal
education mandates (such as the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act). The primary purpose of these mandates is to
promote substantive-as opposed to symbolic-special
education reform in America's K-12 schools.
The parents of speciaJ needs children have also taken an
active role in ensuring that their child receives a quality
education. Current special education laws provide parents with
legally-enforceable rights regarding their child's education.
Although parents may contribute to a dialogue regarding their
child's education, such as the development of an Individualized
Education Plan (IEP), school officials make the final decisions
as to the degree and scope of special education services; this is
due to the fact that parents' legal rights are procedural-as
opposed to substantive-in nature. Thus, although parents are
permitted to actively participate in their child's education
process, the law does not require parental consent with respect
to the contents of the final IEP.
Although, the area of special education law concerning
parental legal rights is relatively clear, certain important
aspects of it are not. Specifically, there has been uncertainty
whether non-lawyer parents have the right in court
proceedings to challenge pro se the suitability of their child's
special education services. The ambiguities of this topic are
highlighted by the immense variability in circuit courts
decisions throughout the country. Recently, the Supreme Court
resolved this unsettled area of law in Winhelman u. Parma
School District.
According to Fisher, "Laws serve two functions: (1) symbolic
and (2) substantive. The symbolic function of law includes such
goals as reaffirming cherished values and showing that
'something is being done' about a perceived social problem." 7
7. Bonnie S. Fisher, Jennifer L. Hartman, Francis T. Cullen & Michael G.
Turner, Making Campuses Safer for Students: The Clery Act as Symbolic Legal Reform,
32 STETSON L. REV. 61 (2002).
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Symbolic legislation is designed to satisfy those who advocated
for the cause, regardless of its effectiveness in addressing the
problem. On the other hand, the substantive function of law is
designed to promote changes that have practical utility:
changes that directly help solve the issue the law was created
to address. 8 Thus, in applying this principle to the Winkelman
v. Parma City School District decision and the current special
education milieu, the question emerges: will the Winkelman
decision make a symbolic or substantive impact on special
education?
This article explores the Winkelman decision and its
implications on public schools, teachers, and parents of
children with disabilities. Part II provides a brief history of
IDEA and describes its statutory framework as it relates to the
substantive and procedural rights of parents. Part III provides
an overview of the legal milieu pertaining to the rights of nonlawyer parents to proceed pro se in court proceedings
challenging whether their child with a disability is receiving a
free appropriate public education as mandated by IDEA. Part
IV analyzes the Winkelman decision and asserts that it will
have a substantive, as opposed to symbolic impact on the
quality of special education in public schools. Additionally, I
assert that the Winkelman decision will help transform IDEA
into a more robust education reform through increased teacher
and school leader accountability for the quality of education
provided to children with disabilities. Finally, Part V explores
the implications of Winkelman on K-12 schools and the parents
of children with disabilities. Specifically, this section argues
that the Winkelman decision is likely to provide more parents
of students with disabilities a forum to advocate for their
child's education, regardless of their socioeconomic status.
II. IDEA STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") is
a federal statute that requires any school receiving federal
funding to provide disabled students a free appropriate public
education. 9 IDEA has become the single most important legal
tool in ensuring that children with mental, physical, emotional,
8. ld.
9. Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006); Bd. of Educ.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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or behavioral disabilities have access to a beneficial education.
Originally passed by Congress as "The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act," IDEA was adopted at a time when
the educational needs of many disabled children were either
severely underserved or ignored all together. 10 In the early
1970's, as many as one million disabled children were not being
provided any education at all. 11 The impetus behind the
passage of IDEA was two federal district court cases from the
early seventies. 12 According to these cases, Equal Protection
commands that States which provided free education for the
general student population needed to extend that same benefit
to disabled students. 13 These courts went on to hold that Due
Process requires a hearing before educational benefits can be
withheld from a disabled student. 14 Prior to these two
landmark decisions, some state laws, such as those in
Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia, allowed public
schools to deny admission to children with an I.Q. below
seventy until they reached the age of eight. 15 It was with this
legal backdrop that Congress created the various provisions of
IDEA focusing on procedural safeguards and increased
protection for children with special education needs.
IDEA guarantees procedural safeguards for students with
disabilities and their parents in all areas relating to
identification, evaluation, and placement. 16 At one time, it was
common practice to evaluate students and make changes in
their educational program without their parents' knowledge or
consent. 17 IDEA elevates the status of parents to that of
important participants in the planning and execution of their
child's educational program. IDEA provides that parents must
be notified and give their consent before their child is assessed
and before the educational program is changed. Specific

10. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills v. Bd. of Ed., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D. D.C. 1972).
13. Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. 279; Mills, 348 F.
Supp. at 875.
14. /d.
15. Suzanne Solomon, The Intersection of 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 6 (2008).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).
17. LAURA R. MCNEAL & COLLEEN M. O'ROURKE, SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR
TEACHERS 31-62 (5th ed. 2009).
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procedures are established in the Act, which must be followed
from evaluation through placement and programming in order
to protect the rights of students and their parents.
The Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") is the most
significant right afforded to disabled students and their
parents by IDEA. 18 IDEA guarantees disabled students the
substantive right to a free appropriate public education. 19 To
this end, the statute requires that, once a child is found
through an evaluation to be disabled, the school must prepare
an IEP for that child. 20 The IEP is meant to bring together the
school administration, parents, the student, and other helpful
parties in order to create an educational plan custom-tailored
to address the particular needs of the student. 21 The written
IEP must include, among other things, a statement of
measurable education goals and how those goals are to be met
in the classroom. 22 The required members of the IEP team are
spelled out. In addition to school personnel, it includes the
child's parents, along with any person whom the parents
believe would be of assistance. 23 Further, parents must receive
extensive notifications of any change or refusal to change their
child's IEP. 24 Parents are also explicitly given several
procedural safeguards during the IEP process-all at the
school's expense-including the right to participate at any
stage, examine documents relating to the IEP process, obtain
an independent evaluation of their child, and mediation. 25
Finally, parents are afforded the option to enroll their child in
private school and seek reimbursement from the school district
if the parents prove that the school district failed to provide
their child with a free appropriate public education. 26
If the IEP is determined to be unsatisfactory, IDEA gives
parents the specific right to challenge the appropriateness of
the IEP in addressing their child's specific needs and any
diagnostic findings upon which the plan is based. The parents'
first option is to dispute the IEP through administrative
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

20 U.S.C. § 1414.
Id. § 1414(d).
Id. § 1414(a) & (d).
McNEAL & O'ROURKE, supra note 17.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
Id. § 1414(d)(l)(B).
ld. § 1415(b) & (c).

Id.
Id. § 1412(a)(lO)(C)(ii).
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proceedings. For example, the parents may demand a Due
Process Hearing before an impartial hearing officer to decide
both the sufficiency of the IEP and whether the school followed
all of the procedural processes. 27 If the parents are still
unsatisfied after the administrative level review, then they can
bring a suit for judicial review in Federal District Court. 2g
Courts reviewing the administrative decisions are empowered
to receive new evidence and make a decision based, first, on
whether "the State has complied with the procedures set forth
in the Act and, second, whether the IEP is reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." 29
Only if both of these prongs are met is the state deemed to
have provided a free appropriate public education. 30 Parents
who are able to succeed on the merits when challenging the
appropriateness of their child's IEP may be entitled to
attorneys' fees. 31 However, until recently it was unclear
whether a disabled student's parents had an independent
substantive right to proceed pro se in a judicial review of the
administrative hearings. Federal circuit courts throughout the
country interpreted this aspect of IDEA differently. The United
States Supreme Court resolved this legal issue in Winkelman v.
Parma City School Districts. 32

III. LEGAL MILIEU
A. A Split in the Circuits
All but one of the Federal Circuits held that non-lawyer
parents pursuing solely substantive claims were not allowed to
represent their children without the assistance of an attorney,
based on their legislative interpretation of IDEA. 33 The
outlying decision, the First Circuit in Maroni v. Pemi-Baker
27. !d. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(ii).
28. !d. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
29. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
30. !d.
31. 20 U.S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
32. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
33. Maroni v. Pemi-baker Reg'! Sch. Dist.. 346 F.:3d 247 (1st Cir. 2003) (allowed
parental prose representation); Collinsgru v. Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1998);
Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005); Mosely v. Bd. of
Educ., 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006); Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123
(2d Cir. 1998).
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Reg'l School District, held that IDEA endowed parents with the
right to represent their child in both administrative and
judicial proceedings without the assistance of legal counsel. 34
The First Circuit reasoned that parents were "parties
aggrieved" within the meaning of the IDEA and, thus, could
sue a school district pro se regardless of whether the rights
asserted were procedural or substantive. However, the vast
majority of federal circuits had a very different interpretation
of IDEA. This position was well represented in the Third
Circuit's opmwn in Collinsgru v. Palmyra Board of
Education. 35 This court reasoned that appearing pro se is
explicitly provided for in IDEA, but only when a party is
pursuing their own rights. 36 Furthermore, the Third Circuit
commented that it is settled common law that non-lawyer
parents are not allowed to represent their children pro se if the
rights asserted are the child's alone. 37 Proceeding from this
basis, the court went on to note that parents may represent
their children under IDEA only if pursuing the parent's own
statutory rights or if Congress had intended for IDEA to allow
for parents, without counsel, to represent their children. The
Third Circuit held that, based on the relevant legal landscape,
there was no evidence that Congress ever intended to allow
parents the option to represent their children in judicial
proceedings. 3 ~
This second allowance was based on the assumption that
Congress is aware of the existing laws and inherent limitations
at the time it passes legislation. 39 Therefore, since Congress
knew that parents were not allowed to appear pro se for their
children under the existing legal landscape, they would have
explicitly designated in the statute that parents have this right
if it was their intent. The court further reasoned that the
plaintiffs in Collinsgru were unable to show any intent on the
part of Congress to grant them the right of pro se
representation and that such a showing was required to change
the current legal regime. 40 The court went on to use a canon of

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Maroni, 346 F.3d 247.
Collinsgru, lfil F.3d 225.
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (200fi).
Osie-Afriyie v. Med. Coli. of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991).
Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231.
!d. at 232.
!d.
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statutory construction, namely expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, to hold that Congress never intended to allow parental
representation in judicial review. 41 The court further reasoned
that because Congress provided for parental representation in
administrative proceedings, but failed to do the same in federal
judicial proceedings, they clearly intended to limit parental pro
se representation to the administrative phase. 42 Once the Third
Circuit had disposed of the argument that Congress intended
to allow parents to represent their children in IDEA cases, the
only remaining issue was whether parents personally had any
justiciable rights.
In this particular case, the Third Circuit held that the
parents had not alleged that any rights particular to the
parents had been abridged, which would allow the parents to
proceed pro se. 43 There are two possible rights that the parents
could have alleged. The first is whether parents have a right to
an education for their children, since parents do have a Due
Process right to make decisions regarding their children's
education. 44 The Court quickly rejected this argument and
proclaimed that "IDEA itself must be the source of any such
right[,]" whether by giving the parents enforceable rights of
their own or by granting the parents joint rights with their
child. 45 It was undisputed that parents could claim that their
procedural rights, such as ability to participate in the IEP
process, had been abridged and that would provide standing to
proceed on their own rights. However, in this case, where the
procedural process had been followed correctly, the parents
could not rely on the substantive claim that the student had
been denied a free appropriate public education. 46
After discussing the statutory language and legislative
history of IDEA, the Third Circuit determined that it was
unclear whether Congress intended to give joint rights to
parents. Additionally, the court ruled that it would refuse to
grant joint rights without clear implication from Congress. 47

41.
42.
43.
44.
U.S. 510

Id.
Id.
Id. at 233.

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
(1925).
45. Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 233.
46. ld. at 234.
47. Id. at 235.
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After Collinsgru, the Third Circuit joined a nearly unanimous
federal judiciary in holding that non-lawyer parents could not
prosecute IDEA claims on behalf of their children prose.
As noted previously, the only federal court circuit that did
allow pro se parental representation for substantive violations
of IDEA was the First Circuit.48 The First Circuit "conclude[d]
that parents are parties aggrieved within the meaning of
IDEA, and thus may sue pro se."49 The court based this
conclusion primarily on the statutory language of IDEA and
basic precepts of administrative law. By including parents as
parties aggrieved in administrative hearings, the court
reasoned that Congress, likewise, intended parents be included
as parties aggrieved for judicial review. 50 The court quickly
established the parents' standing by pointing out that review of
administrative decisions is not generally governed by whether
the right is procedural or substantive, but rather whether the
challenging party has constitutional standing. 51 Further, the
court explained that Congress obviously understood that
"IDEA ... relies upon the central role played by parents in
assuring that their child receives a free appropriate public
education," and that allowing parents to represent their
children pro se for all claims was necessary to foster that goal.
Concomitantly, both the First and Third Circuit Courts
solidified the need for judicial clarity on this issue. It was
evident that the circuits were intractably split.

B. Split Resolved: Winkelman v. Parma City School District
Recognizing the division among the various circuit court
decisions regarding parental pro se representation for
substantive IDEA claims, the United States Supreme Court
resolved this unsettled area of law in its review of Winkelman
v. Parma City School District. 52 The Winkelman's were the
parents of a six-year-old child with autism named Jacob, who
was a student of the Parma City School District. 53 Prior to the
2003-2004 school year, the Winkelman's and the school district,
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
2005).

Maroni, 346 F.3d 247.
!d. at 250.
!d. at 252.
!d. at 25.'3.
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 522 (2007).
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 411 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724-25 (N.D. Ohio
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as required under IDEA, worked together to create an IEP for
Jacob. 54 The Winkelmans opposed the IEP created for Jacob
because it failed to provide him with enough music and speech
therapy and one-on-one interaction. The Winkelman's
preferred that Jacob be placed in a private school that
specialized in educating autistic children, at the school
district's expense, in lieu of attending a special education
classroom in a public school. Dissatisfied with the contents of
the proposed IEP, the Winkelman's placed Jacob in private
school at their own expense and pursued administrative review
of their son's IEP.5 5
After both the initial hearing officer and a state-level
review officer rejected their challenge to the quality and
appropriateness of Jacob's IEP, the Winkelman's sought review
of the decision in federal district court. 56 In their complaint, the
Winkelman's insisted that Jacob's IEP did not provide him
with a free appropriate public education as required by IDEA. 57
The district court found that Jacob had been provided with a
free appropriate public education as required by IDEA. 5R
Representing their son pro se, the Winkelman's appealed the
district court's decision; however, the Sixth Circuit dismissed
the case because the Winkelman's had not retained a licensed
attorney to represent their son. The court relied on its prior
decision in Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School District, 59
which held that IDEA only intended for parents to represent
their children during the administrative stage of the disputenot in judicial proceedings. The parents sought certiorari 60 and
the United States Supreme Court granted it; finally, the stage
was set for a resolution of this issue.
The petitioners, the Winkelmans, argued before the
Supreme Court, that they should be allowed to proceed past the
administrative review stage without the services of a lawyer. 61
The petitioners asserted that a comprehensive reading of IDEA
showed that Congress clearly intended to give parents

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

ld. at 725.
ld.
Id. at 725-26.
Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 520-21.
ld. at 521.
Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2005).
Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 522.
ld. at 522.
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independent enforceable rights and make them an interested
party. 62 Conversely, the school district contended that IDEA
"accords parents nothing more than 'collateral tools related to
the child's underlying substantive rights-not freestanding or
independently enforceable rights."' 63 Alternatively, the school
district argued that, even if parents have independent rights,
spending clause legislation requires that the statute provide
clear notice that parents may represent themselves, which
IDEA failed to do. 64 With a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court
announced its decision. 65

IV. ANALYSIS OF WINKELMAN V. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
In Winkelman u. Parma City School District, the United
States Supreme Court ruled in favor of giving non-lawyer
parents the right to proceed pro se in court proceedings
regarding whether their disabled children are receiving a free
appropriate public education under IDEA. 66 Justice Kennedy
explains the Court's rationale by outlining the parts of IDEA
that were particularly relevant to the Winkelman's claim:
"procedures to be followed when developing a child's IEP;
criteria governing the sufficiency of an education provided to a
child; mechanisms for review that must be made available
when there are objections to the IEP; and the requirements in
certain circumstances that States reimburse parents for
various expenses." 67 By examining various provisions of the
statute bearing parental involvement, the Court explains that
IDEA provides parents with their own substantive rights. 68
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, highlights the
parts of IDEA that guide the process of creating and
challenging an IEP and the inclusion of parental involvement
in that process. 69 These provisions require that parents be
provided with certain information, involved in developing an
IEP, and included in the decision-making process.7° The
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

!d.
Id. at 527-28 (citation omitted).
ld. at 533-34.
ld. at 518.
Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 5:33.
ld. at 523.
ld. at 523-26.
ld. at 523-24.
ld. at 524.
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parental right to involvement in the IEP process is intended to
ensure that children are provided with a suitable education. 71
Furthermore, "the instruction must, in addition, be provided at
no cost to parents." 72 The Court's review of this issue continues
with a meticulous examination of provisions allowing parents
dissatisfied with the IEP to seek administrative review and the
legislative purpose of those hearings guaranteed to parents by
IDEA.
IDEA also provides rights with respect to litigation and
review. IDEA explicitly provides that parents will be
participating parties during the administrative hearings.7 3 The
cost-recovery portion of IDEA provides a venue for parents to
be reimbursed by their child's school district for the cost of
private school enrollment and attorney's fees if the parent is a
prevailing party_74 The Court holds that these provisions
clearly show that "[p]arents enjoy enforceable rights at the
administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the
statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these
rights in federal court." 75
The Court disposes of the argument that these provisions
merely give parents a procedural right, not the freestanding
right to challenge whether the student has been provided a free
appropriate public education. 76 The purpose of IDEA is "to
ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents
of such children are protected." 77 Then the Court showcases
past precedent for the proposition that "parents have a
recognized legal interest in the education and upbringing of
their child." 78
Acknowledging the current legal landscape, the Court finds
it highly likely that Congress intended the same right to accrue
to parents under IDEA. 79 The statute explicitly states that
parents will be participating parties during the administrative

71. !d. at 523.
72. !d. at 525 (quoting Individuals with Disabilities Education Act § 1401(29))
(emphasis added).
73. !d. at 525.
7 4. !d. at 526.
75. !d. at 528.
76. !d.
77. !d. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B)).
78. !d. at 529.
79. !d.
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and also that any party aggrieved by the
administrative decision has a right to bring action in federal
court. 81 The majority reasons that "party aggrieved" must
include the parents since they had participated in the
administrative hearing. x2 It would be incongruous to make
some of the parents' rights, such as tuition reimbursement and
attorney's fees, contingent on a successful outcome, and yet not
allow the parents to litigate the central issue and achieve that
necessary successful outcome. 83 These procedural rights are
"intertwined with the substantive adequacy of the education
provided to the child," and the difficulty in deciding which
provision gives rights to parents or a child would be a confusing
judicial practice. 84 These procedural mechanisms were given to
parents so that they may properly defend their own
substantive right to ensure that their child receives a free
appropriate public education. 85 The majority finishes by
arguing that principles of equity and justice demand that
parents possess the substantive right to proceed without a
lawyer; otherwise, only those families that could afford to
retain counsel could challenge their disabled children's
education despite the obvious congressional intent to the
contrary, evidenced by the provision of attorney's fees in the
statute. 86
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, uses his usual plain
textual style to rebuke the majority for reading substantive
parental rights into the statute. The dissent reasoned that
parents do not have a right for their child to receive a free
appropriate public education, and thus cannot proceed pro se
on that claim. 87 The dissent agrees that parents do have a
procedural right to represent themselves in federal court, but
when the claim is concerned only with the adequacy of the free
appropriate public education, the right remains only with the
child. 88 Therefore, parents may not represent themselves.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 525, 530.
/d. at 531.
Id.
Id. at 530-31.
/d. at 531-32.
Id. at 532-3:~.

86.

/d.

87. Id. at 538 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
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The dissent further supports their argument by
highlighting that the parts of the statute discussing a free
appropriate public education only name the child as the
beneficiary. 89 Unlike the majority, the dissent does not believe
that a parent's rights are synonymous with the child's, but
rather each has specific dichotomous rights explicitly assigned
by Congress. He examines several provisions, such as the right
to dismiss an IEP team member 90 and the right to
reimbursement, 91 which all grant rights to parents that would
be absurd if granted to children in an attempt to discredit the
majority's stance. 92 Additionally, certain procedural guarantees
allow parents to participate in the challenging IEPs, but does
not grant parents any rights in that education. 93 The dissent
attempts to rebut the argument that allowing attorney's fees
only if parents can show an inadequate fre0 appropriate public
education says nothing about that underlying right, but merely
what must be shown to vindicate the parent's right. 94 Finally,
the dissent ends with its own policy argument contending that,
under IDEA, parents are provided with the same option that
parents are usually afforded: namely, the right to sue in federal
court with a lawyer. 95 The dissent points out the ills that may
arise from allowing a greater number of pro se cases in federal
courts, such as an influx of frivolous cases in federal district
courts. 96 Without specific language in the statute, the dissent
refuses to infer any congressional intent to allow non-lawyer
parents to challenge the quality of education their children are
receiving under IDEA. 97
Winkelman seems to be a case that was decided
predominantly on policy concerns rather than strict legal
reasoning. The argument for both sides hinges on whether
parents are "parties aggrieved," as used in IDEA. 98 The
majority grasps for various provisions in the statute to bolster
the argument that Congress intended to provide parents the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

ld.
20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(C)(i)·(iii)(2004).
Id. § 1412(a)(lO)(C)(ii).
Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 541 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
ld. at 539.
Id. at 541-42.
ld. at 542.
Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 538.
20 U.S.C § 1415(i)(2)(A)(2004).
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right to challenge the substantive education plan for their
child. However, never do they present a provision that
definitively silences the debate. The decision could have come
to the same result with greater effect by merely accepting that
parents and children must share the same substantive rights
to allow the structure of IDEA to function properly and that
parents' interest in their children receiving a free appropriate
public education is enough to warrant parents to have the right
to pursue this end without legal representation.
The substantive function of law is to promote changes that
solve the issue in which the law was intended to address. Given
the salience of misdiagnosis of appropriate educational services
for students with special needs, 99 it is imperative that parents
are empowered with substantive rights that will allow them to
ensure their child receives an appropriate education.
There can be little doubt that Congress provided these
various procedural rights to parents for any reason other than
to ensure parents could demand that their disabled child had
access to a free appropriate public education. Congress
recognized the inability of disabled students to serve as
advocates for themselves and challenge the quality of their
education on their own, and thus provided a system which
appoints a representative for the child when parents are
unavailable. 100 To this end, Congress provided parents with the
means to serve as effective advocates throughout the entire
procedural process contemplated by IDEA, not just select
stages.
There would be a disconnect if parents are intended to have
every tool available to vigorously defend their child's rights, but
then be foreclosed the opportunity to defend those rights in
court. The strongest argument for the majority is the absurdity
that would result from parents being able to challenge for
procedural violations, but not be able to obtain judicial review
of what is the central concern of the parents, namely, the
quality of their child's education. What parent is actually
concerned with whether they were provided the opportunity to
review all of the relevant documents as long as their disabled
child is receiving the best education available? It is illogical to
99. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Weiner, Discrimination in Our Public Schools:
Comprehensive Legal Challenges to an Inadequate Special Education Services for
Minority Children. 36 HARV. C.R.·C.L. L. REV. 407 (2001).
100. !d.§ 1415(b)(2).
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allow parents to recover tuition costs and attorney's fees, but
then limit that recovery to prevailing on a cause of action not
their own and one the parents cannot litigate without a lawyer.
A telling part of IDEA is the provision that classifies
parents as "parties aggrieved" for administrative hearings. 101
Apparently, the only logical progression would use the same
definition later when discussing judicial review. Congress
obviously intended to give parents substantive rights and to
include them as a "party aggrieved," otherwise they would have
only named the child as having the right to bring an action in
federal district court. The majority is correct in that the
procedural and substantive rights are so intertwined that they
rely on each other to ensure the legislative intent of the Act,
which is to guarantee that every disabled student gets a free
appropriate public education. The parents' rights and the
child's rights are synonymous; their use is merely apportioned
to the parent or child in a way that allows IDEA to function by
providing them to the party most able to exercise that function.
The majority could have greatly simplified their decision
merely by announcing that parents also have an enforceable
right to their children receiving a free appropriate public
education. Parents already possess a constitutional right to
control the education of their children. 102 Therefore, it is a
short leap from that proposition to giving parents the right to
ensure that their children receive a free appropriate public
education. In a sense, this right is a necessary corollary to the
right to control a child's education. Control implicates the
ability to ensure that education occurs in an appropriate
manner. The drafters of IDEA envisioned this, as evidenced by
the substantial amount of statutory language that is designed
to give parents the tools to ensure their children receive a
quality education. Neither side of the debate disputes the
notion that parents have an interest in their children receiving
a free appropriate public education, which is an interest more
than strong enough to create a right to sue under IDEA. The
profound benefits that accrue to parents from their child
receiving a free appropriate public education, such as a lesser
likelihood that parents will have to continuously support their
child later in life, is well-established in the special education

101. !d.§ 1415(g)(l).
102. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
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literature. 103 In fact, individuals have been allowed to bring
suit for far less important interests. Therefore, it seems
unnecessary to entangle the parents' and child's rights because
the parents have such a strong interest on which to support
judicial review.
IDEA has the goal to provide disabled children throughout
the country access to a free appropriate public education, as a
substantive, and not symbolic, right. A free appropriate public
education implies that Congress intended it to be provided
regardless of whether the family has the ability to pay for the
education. Failure to provide parents full access to the judicial
review process, simply because they lack the financial means to
hire a lawyer, directly contradicts the purpose of the law, which
seeks to ensure that every child in America has access to a
quality education. Although, it is likely that the Winkelman
decision will increase the number of frivolous lawsuits, the
benefits of ensuring that every parent of a child with a
disability has an enforceable right to their child receiving a free
appropriate education, far exceeds the costs of increased
litigation.
Justice Scalia's proposed regime would run counter to this
purpose. The ability to pay for representation would define
which families could challenge the quality of the education
provided to their disabled child. The families at the bottom of
the socio-economic scale with disabled children are the families
that likely are unable to afford expensive private school tuition
or attend well-funded schools in affluent districts. These are
the families that have the greatest need for the public
education envisioned by IDEA. These are the families IDEA
was designed to protect. This is evidenced by a recent report
from the U.S. Department of Education, which found that twothirds (approximately 4.5 million) of children with disabilities
come from families who earn less than $50,000 per year. 104
Additionally, over two million children with disabilities live in
households that earn less than $25,000 annually. 105 Therefore,
prior to the Winkelman decision it is likely that many parents

103. Marlene Simon, Beyond Broken Promises: Reflections on Eliminating Barriers
to the Success of Minority Youth with Disabilities, The Journal of the Association for
Persons with Severe Handicaps, 26 (3) (2001).
104. The Scales Tip in Favor of Parents in Winkelman v. Parma City School
District, 28 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDJCIAHY 277, 313·14 (2008).
105. !d. at 313.
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of children with disabilities were unable to advocate for their
child's right to a free appropriate public education through the
legal system because they did not have the monetary resources
to obtain legal representation. The ability of parents to ensure
the quality of their child's education should not be dependent
upon their ability to afford legal representation. According to a
study conducted by the Council of Parent Attorneys and
Advocates, legal representation for special education claims
can range anywhere from $10,000 to $100.000, which far
beyond what the majority of special education households are
able to pay. 106
Despite the laudable goals of IDEA to improve the quality
of special education, legal cases such as Winkelman illuminate
the inability of many parents to serve as advocates for their
child's education due to their inability to pay for legal
representation. The underlying principle of IDEA is the notion
that all students should be afforded the opportunity to excel
academically through high quality instruction. 107 For various
reasons, such as low expectations or exclusion from the general
classroom, children with disabilities often do not receive access
to the same quality of education as general education students.
Furthermore, children with disabilities are arguably the most
vulnerable student population because they are often unable to
communicate their educational experiences to parents and
teachers. Therefore, it is imperative that parents of children
with disabilities have meaningful opportunities to both
participate in and evaluate the education of their child.
Although some may argue that non-lawyer parents of children
with disabilities are not qualified to represent their child in
court pro se, special education parents are often the most wellversed on their child's education needs because they typically
are the primary caregiver. Furthermore, it is better for children
with special needs to have a parental advocate as opposed to
having no representation at all.

106. The Couneil of Parent Attorneys and Advocates is a non-profit organization
that seeks to provide special education law resources and training for parents,
attorneys, and special education advocates (citing to Brief for Council of Parent
Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. et a!., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9-10,
n.4, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007)).
107. McNEAL & O'ROURKE, supra note 17, at 31-62.
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V. CONCLUSION

In recent years, there has been an increased interest in
promoting social justice within America's schools, as
researchers, educators, and policymakers struggle to provide
all students with a high quality education. Social justice may
be defined as "an ideal condition in which all members of a
society have the same basic rights, protection, opportunities,
obligations, and social benefits." 108 The Supreme Court ruling
in Winkelman v. Parma City School District will help promote
social justice in America's schools by empowering parents of
students with disabilities with substantive rights to appear pro
se in federal court to challenge the appropriateness of their
child's IEP. As the special education landscape continues to
shift its focus from access to quality, commendable decisions
such as Winkelman v. Parma City School District will continue
to ensure that all disabled students receive a quality education,
regardless of their race, gender, or socioeconomic status. The
alternative-excluding parents from full participation in their
child's education process-would directly contradict the spirit
of special education law, which seeks to guarantee educational
excellence for all. The Winkelman decision suggests that the
current judicial terrain supports this notion of strengthening
the substantive role and responsibility of special education
parents in the educational lives of their children both today
and in the years to come. Ultimately, Winkelman will help
transform IDEA into more substantive, robust education
reform through increased teacher and school leader
accountability for the quality of education provided to children
with disabilities.

108. ROB8RT L. BARKF:R, SOCIAL WORK DICTIONARY, (5th ed. 2003), s.v. Social
Justice.

